TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kambayashi, Ryo
AU  - Kawaguchi, Kohei
AU  - Otani, Suguru
        TI  - Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching
        PY  - 2025/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 17613
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp17613
        AB  - This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.
        KW  - market power of employers
KW  - monopsony
KW  - job matching intermediary
KW  - recruitment elasticity
KW  - inquiry
KW  - application
KW  - interview
KW  - offer
KW  - control function approach
        ER  -