%0 Report
        %A Kambayashi, Ryo
%A Kawaguchi, Kohei
%A Otani, Suguru
        %T Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching
        %D 2025
        %8 2025 Jan
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 17613
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp17613
        %X This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.
        %K market power of employers
%K monopsony
%K job matching intermediary
%K recruitment elasticity
%K inquiry
%K application
%K interview
%K offer
%K control function approach