@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp17613,
            	author={Kambayashi, Ryo and Kawaguchi, Kohei and Otani, Suguru},
            	title={Decomposing Recruitment Elasticity in Job Matching},
            	year={2025},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={17613},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp17613},
	abstract={This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.},
	keywords={market power of employers;monopsony;job matching intermediary;recruitment elasticity;inquiry;application;interview;offer;control function approach},
            }