TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Häfner, Samuel
AU  - Haeusle, Niklas
AU  - Koeniger, Winfried
AU  - Braun, Alexander
        TI  - Optimal Compensation in Competitive Labor Markets with Heterogeneous Employers and Workers
        PY  - 2024/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 17449
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp17449
        AB  - We develop a model in which large risk-neutral firms and individual risk-averse consumers compete to employ heterogeneous workers by posting compensation menus. Production takes time, and we analyze how screening motives interact with the desire to smooth consumption. There is a unique symmetric separating equilibrium that is also efficient. In equilibrium, the extent to which the compensation scheme delays payment until the production quality becomes known depends on whether, and to which extent, the consumers are financially constrained. We discuss how our model relates to the design of compensation schemes in current online peer-to-peer markets.
        KW  - adverse selection
KW  - self selection
KW  - peer-to-peer markets
KW  - labor markets
KW  - capital market imperfections
        ER  -