TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Berg, Gerard J. van den
AU  - Foerster, Hanno
AU  - Uhlendorff, Arne
        TI  - Structural Empirical Analysis of Vacancy Referrals with Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence
        PY  - 2023/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 16495
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp16495
        AB  - This paper provides a structural analysis of the role of job vacancy referrals (VRs) by public employment agencies in the job search behavior of unemployed individuals, incorporating institutional features of the monitoring of search behavior by the agencies. Notably, rejections of VRs may lead to sanctions (temporary benefits reductions) while workers may report sick to avoid those. We estimate models using German administrative data from social security records linked with caseworker recorded data on VRs, sick reporting and sanctions. The analysis highlights the influence of aspects of the health care system on unemployment durations. We estimate that for around 25% of unemployed workers, removing the channel that enables strategic sick reporting reduces the mean unemployment duration by 4 days.
        KW  - physician
KW  - sickness absence
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - sanctions
KW  - wage
KW  - unemployment
KW  - structural estimation
KW  - counterfactual policy evaluation
KW  - unemployment duration
        ER  -