@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp16141,
            	author={Rodemeier, Matthias and Löschel, Andreas},
            	title={Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments},
            	year={2023},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={16141},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp16141},
	abstract={How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of 11 euros raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: 
information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies are up to 150% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.},
	keywords={energy efficiency;field experiments;internality taxes;optimal taxation;nudges;information;behavioral public economics},
            }