TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Jost, Peter J.
AU  - Kräkel, Matthias
        TI  - Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments
        PY  - 2000/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 159
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp159
        AB  - Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents’ strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
        KW  - sequential tournaments
KW  - rank-order tournaments
KW  - Preemptive behavior
        ER  -