@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp159,
            	author={Jost, Peter J. and Kräkel, Matthias},
            	title={Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments},
            	year={2000},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={159},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp159},
	abstract={Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents’ strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.},
	keywords={sequential tournaments;rank-order tournaments;Preemptive behavior},
            }