@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1561,
            	author={Dessy, Sylvain and Djebbari, Habiba},
            	title={Career Choice, Marriage-Timing, and the Attraction of Unequals},
            	year={2005},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1561},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1561},
	abstract={Both men and women wish to have a family and a rewarding career. In this paper, we show that the under-representation of women in high-powered professions may reflect a coordination failure in young women’s marriage-timing decisions. Since investing in a high-powered career imposes time strain, it precludes early participation in the marriage market. Delayed participation in the marriage market has a higher cost for women than for men because women have shorter fecundity horizons. Marriage prospects of high-powered women depend on the marriage-timing decisions of younger women. Under these assumptions, we show that women’s marriage-timing decisions exhibit strategic complementarities. Coordination failures in women’s marriage-timing decisions lead to persisting gender differences in career choices. Yet, differential fecundity is only necessary, but not sufficient to obtain gender inequality in high-powered professions. We discuss social changes that solve the coordination failure while achieving a Pareto-improvement in the society at large.},
	keywords={supermodular game;strategic complementarities;coordination failure;marriage-timing;multiple equilibria;high-powered career},
            }