TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bigoni, Maria
AU  - Casari, Marco
AU  - Salvanti, Andrea
AU  - Skrzypacz, Andrzej
AU  - Spagnolo, Giancarlo
        TI  - It’s Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
        PY  - 2022/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 15023
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp15023
        AB  - In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant of cooperation. This comment introduces the "Payback" strategy, which is similar to TFT but is sustainable in equilibrium. Using the data from the original article, we show that Payback captures most of the empirical support previously attributed to TFT, and that the risk dominance criterion based on Payback can explain the observed cooperation patterns.
        KW  - asymmetric strategies
KW  - imperfect monitoring
KW  - indefinitely repeated games
KW  - risk dominance
KW  - strategic risk
        ER  -