TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gibson, Matthew
        TI  - Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley
        PY  - 2021/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 14843
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp14843
        AB  - Adam Smith alleged that employers sometimes secretly collude to reduce labor earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: illegal no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average, the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 4.8 percent. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected. These estimates are consistent with considerable employer market power.
        KW  - oligopsony
KW  - employer market power
KW  - labor earnings
KW  - monopsony
        ER  -