TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bigoni, Maria
AU  - Ploner, Matteo
AU  - Vu, Thi-Thanh-Tam
        TI  - The Right Person for the Right Job: Workers' Prosociality as a Screening Device
        PY  - 2021/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 14779
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp14779
        AB  - The impact of workers' non-pecuniary motivation on their productivity is a fundamental issue in labor economics. Previous studies indicate that prosocially motivated workers may perform better when assigned to jobs having socially desirable implications – even if effort is non contractible and they are offered a low-powered fixed-compensation scheme – as compared to a standard job with an effort-contingent payment. This suggests that profit maximizing employers should assign workers to different jobs, based on workers' prosociality. We run an experiment to explore the link between workers' prosociality and their level of effort under a prosocial and a standard job, and show that employers actually exploit the information on workers' prosociality to assign them the type of job that would be most profitable from the firm's perspective.
        KW  - principal-agent game
KW  - laboratory experiment
KW  - incentives
KW  - dictator game
KW  - real-effort task
        ER  -