%0 Report
        %A Bassanini, Andrea
%A Caroli, Eve
%A Fontaine, Francois
%A Rebérioux, Antoine
        %T Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms
        %D 2021
        %8 2021 Jan
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 14029
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp14029
        %X We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
        %K social pressure
%K employment contracts
%K adjustment costs
%K CEO reputation