@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp14029,
            	author={Bassanini, Andrea and Caroli, Eve and Fontaine, Francois and Rebérioux, Antoine},
            	title={Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms},
            	year={2021},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={14029},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp14029},
	abstract={We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.},
	keywords={social pressure;employment contracts;adjustment costs;CEO reputation},
            }