@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp13924,
            	author={Bellani, Luna and Fabella, Vigile Marie and Scervini, Francesco},
            	title={Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power},
            	year={2020},
	month={Dec},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={13924},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13924},
	abstract={Policy reforms are often multifaceted. In the rent-seeking literature policies are usually taken as one-dimensional. This paper models policy formation using a political contest with endogenous policy proposals containing two dimensions. The two dimensions provide an opportunity to trade off one policy over another to make the lobbying opposition less aggressive. In a first stage, the Government proposes a reform over the two policies, and in a second stage engages in a contest with an Interest Group over the enactment of the proposed reform. As a result, the Government makes a compromise, under-proposing in the policy the Interest Group opposes and over-proposing in the policy the Interest Group desires. Effectively, there will be strategic bundling of desired policies with undesired ones in an attempt to increase enactment probability and overall utility.},
	keywords={lobbies;political reforms;contest},
            }