TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gächter, Simon
AU  - Riedl, Arno
        TI  - Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations
        PY  - 2004/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 1375
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1375
        AB  - Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and
axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence
on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We
examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation
behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the
normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe
actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the
proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation
agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.
        KW  - laboratory experiment
KW  - bankruptcy problems with claims
KW  - proportional rule
KW  - equal-awards rule
KW  - equallosses rule
KW  - fairness
KW  - vignette
        ER  -