TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Leaver, Clare
AU  - Ozier, Owen
AU  - Serneels, Pieter
AU  - Zeitlin, Andrew
        TI  - Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
        PY  - 2020/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 13696
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13696
        AB  - This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay- for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
        KW  - teachers
KW  - incentives
KW  - selection
KW  - pay-for-performance
KW  - field experiment
        ER  -