TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
        TI  - Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
        PY  - 2004/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 1337
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1337
        AB  - Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will
not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments
show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the
implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral
strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group
size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test these hypotheses experimentally
and examine whether the effect of group size is purely due to the number of group members
or if information about other group members is what is important. We find that large groups
contribute at rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably
in large groups. However, hindrances to monitoring do reduce the provision of the public
good.
        KW  - experiment
KW  - group size
KW  - punishment
KW  - public goods
KW  - simulation
        ER  -