TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Stefan, Matthias
AU  - Huber, Jürgen
AU  - Kirchler, Michael
AU  - Sutter, Matthias
AU  - Walzl, Markus
        TI  - Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect
        PY  - 2020/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 13345
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13345
        AB  - Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.
        KW  - framed field experiment
KW  - rank incentives
KW  - multi-tasking decision problem
KW  - finance professionals
        ER  -