%0 Report
        %A Stefan, Matthias
%A Huber, Jürgen
%A Kirchler, Michael
%A Sutter, Matthias
%A Walzl, Markus
        %T Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect
        %D 2020
        %8 2020 Jun
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 13345
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13345
        %X Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.
        %K framed field experiment
%K rank incentives
%K multi-tasking decision problem
%K finance professionals