@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp13345,
            	author={Stefan, Matthias and Huber, Jürgen and Kirchler, Michael and Sutter, Matthias and Walzl, Markus},
            	title={Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect},
            	year={2020},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={13345},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13345},
	abstract={Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.},
	keywords={framed field experiment;rank incentives;multi-tasking decision problem;finance professionals},
            }