TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Dupuy, Arnaud
AU  - Galichon, Alfred
AU  - Jaffe, Sonia
AU  - Kominers, Scott Duke
        TI  - Taxation in Matching Markets
        PY  - 2020/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 13328
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13328
        AB  - We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.
        KW  - matching
KW  - taxation
        ER  -