%0 Report
        %A Dupuy, Arnaud
%A Galichon, Alfred
%A Jaffe, Sonia
%A Kominers, Scott Duke
        %T Taxation in Matching Markets
        %D 2020
        %8 2020 Jun
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 13328
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13328
        %X We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.
        %K matching
%K taxation