@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp13328,
            	author={Dupuy, Arnaud and Galichon, Alfred and Jaffe, Sonia and Kominers, Scott Duke},
            	title={Taxation in Matching Markets},
            	year={2020},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={13328},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13328},
	abstract={We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be non-monotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative non-pecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.},
	keywords={matching;taxation},
            }