@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp13305,
            	author={Kutscher, Macarena and Nath, Shanjukta and Urzua, Sergio},
            	title={Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform},
            	year={2020},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={13305},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13305},
	abstract={This paper investigates whether centralized admissions systems can alter school segregation. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decentralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its incremental implementation and employ a Difference-in-Difference design. Using rich administrative student-level records, we find the effect of SAS critically depends on pre-existing levels of residential segregation and local school supply. For instance, districts with prominent provision of private education experience an uptick in school segregation due to SAS. Migration of high-SES students to private schools emerges as a key driver.},
	keywords={segregation;inequality;education},
            }