@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp13132,
            	author={Maclean, J. Catherine and Pichler, Stefan and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.},
            	title={Mandated Sick Pay: Coverage, Utilization, and Welfare Effects},
            	year={2020},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={13132},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp13132},
	abstract={This paper evaluates the labor market effects of sick pay mandates in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 13 percentage points from a baseline level of 66%. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out other non-mandated fringe benefits. We then develop a model of optimal sick pay provision along with a welfare analysis. For a range of plausible parameter values, mandating sick pay increases welfare.},
	keywords={labor costs;unintended consequences;moral hazard;fringe benefits;employer mandates;medical leave;sick leave;sick pay mandates;National Compensation Survey (NCS);welfare effects;optimal social insurance;Baily-Chetty},
            }