@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1298,
            	author={Roider, Andreas},
            	title={Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract},
            	year={2004},
	month={Sep},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1298},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1298},
	abstract={The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met.},
	keywords={hold-up;delegation;decentralization;authority;property rights;incomplete contracts},
            }