TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kölling, Arnd
AU  - Schnabel, Claus
        TI  - Owners, External Managers, and Industrial Relations in German Establishments
        PY  - 2019/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 12767
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp12767
        AB  - Using data from the representative IAB Establishment Panel in Germany and estimating a panel probit model with fixed effects, this paper finds a negative relationship between the existence of owner-management in an establishment and the probabilities of having a works council or a collective bargaining agreement. We show that family firms which are solely, partially or not managed by the owners significantly differ in the presence of works councils and collective bargaining agreements. 
The probabilities of having works councils and collective agreements increase substantially if just some of the managers do not belong to the owner family. We argue that these differences cannot simply be attributed to an aversion of the owners against co-determination and unions but require taking account of the notion of socio-emotional wealth prevalent in family firms. In addition, our results support the idea that external managers mainly act as agents rather than stewards in family firms. 
        KW  - industrial relations
KW  - co-determination
KW  - works council
KW  - collective agreement
KW  - family firm
KW  - Germany
        ER  -