@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp11967,
            	author={He, Yinghua and Magnac, Thierry},
            	title={A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets},
            	year={2018},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={11967},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11967},
	abstract={Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases with the number of applicants to be screened. To combat this externality that applicants impose on programs, application costs can be used as a Pigouvian tax. Higher costs reduce congestion by discouraging applicants from applying to certain programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market, we implement variants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with different application costs. Our experimental and structural estimates show that a (low) application cost effectively reduces congestion without harming match quality.},
	keywords={Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Mechanism;costly preference formation;screening;stable matching;congestion;matching market place},
            }