@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1179,
            	author={Hunt, Jennifer},
            	title={Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime},
            	year={2004},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1179},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1179},
	abstract={I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results
through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust
may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption.
Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of
areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents
their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances,
using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time
to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against
corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that
victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue
that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.},
	keywords={networks;crime;corruption},
            }