@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp11593,
            	author={Bennett, John and Rablen, Matthew D.},
            	title={Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure},
            	year={2018},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={11593},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11593},
	abstract={We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the investor, using the threat of expropriation to demand a lower final price or another bribe. Depending on the level of care for domestic welfare, greater bureaucratic centralization may increase or decrease domestic welfare. Because of the threat of hold-up, bribery may result in greater domestic welfare than the honest benchmark does.},
	keywords={centralized bureaucracy;bureaucratic structure;renegotiation;hold-up;bribery;decentralized bureaucracy},
            }