%0 Report
        %A Baharad, Eyal
%A Danziger, Leif
        %T Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
        %D 2018
        %8 2018 Jan
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 11287
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11287
        %X We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.
        %K committee decisions
%K scoring rules
%K "almost" voting rules