@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp11287,
            	author={Baharad, Eyal and Danziger, Leif},
            	title={Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?},
            	year={2018},
	month={Jan},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={11287},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11287},
	abstract={We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.},
	keywords={committee decisions;scoring rules;"almost" voting rules},
            }