TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Behnk, Sascha
AU  - Hao, Li
AU  - Reuben, Ernesto
        TI  - Partners in Crime: Diffusion of Responsibility in Antisocial Behaviors
        PY  - 2017/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 11031
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11031
        AB  - Using a series of sender-receiver games, we find that two senders acting together are willing to behave more antisocially towards the receiver than single senders. This result is robust in two contexts: when antisocial messages are dishonest and when they are honest but unfavorable. Our results suggest that diffusion of responsibility is the primary reason for the increased antisocial behavior as our experimental design eliminates competing explanations. With a partner in crime, senders think that behaving antisocially is more acceptable and experience less guilt. Importantly, we identify a crucial condition for the increased antisocial behavior by groups: the partner in crime must actively participate in the decision-making. Our results have important implications for institutional design and promoting prosocial behaviors. 
        KW  - moral norms
KW  - antisocial behavior
KW  - diffusion of responsibility
KW  - guilt aversion
        ER  -