%0 Report
        %A Cahuc, Pierre
%A Nevoux, Sandra
        %T Inefficient Short-Time Work
        %D 2017
        %8 2017 Sep
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 11010
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11010
        %X This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.
        %K short-time work
%K unemployment insurance
%K experience rating