@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp11010,
            	author={Cahuc, Pierre and Nevoux, Sandra},
            	title={Inefficient Short-Time Work},
            	year={2017},
	month={Sep},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={11010},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp11010},
	abstract={This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.},
	keywords={short-time work;unemployment insurance;experience rating},
            }