%0 Report
        %A Dasgupta, Indraneel
%A Neogi, Ranajoy Guha
        %T Between-Group Contests over Group-Specific Public Goods with Within-Group Fragmentation
        %D 2017
        %8 2017 Jul
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 10881
        %U https://www.iza.org/publications/dp10881
        %X We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot coordinate with one another. All sub-groups choose effort allocations simultaneously. We find that aggregate rent-seeking rises, social welfare falls, and both communities are worse off when the dominant sub-groups within both communities increase their population shares relative to the respective average sub-group population. 
Any unilateral increase in fragmentation within a group reduces conflict and makes its opponent better off. The fragmenting community itself may however be better off as well, even though its share of the public good falls. Thus, a reduced share of public good provisioning cannot be used to infer a negative welfare implication for the losing community.
        %K contest
%K group-specific public good
%K local public good
%K ethnic conflict
%K within-group fragmentation