@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1020,
            	author={Koskela, Erkki and Stenbacka, Rune},
            	title={Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment},
            	year={2004},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1020},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp1020},
	abstract={We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.},
	keywords={equilibrium unemployment;compensation systems;wage and loan bargaining;outside options},
            }