TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Chen, Yefeng
AU  - Jiang, Shuguang
AU  - Villeval, Marie Claire
        TI  - The Tragedy of Corruption
        PY  - 2016/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 10175
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp10175
        AB  - We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective sanction diminishes the officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in the absence of corruption.
        KW  - corruption
KW  - social dilemma
KW  - collective risk
KW  - sanction
KW  - experiment
        ER  -