@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp10153,
            	author={Dyballa, Katharina and Kraft, Kornelius},
            	title={How Do Labor Representatives Affect Incentive Orientation of Executive Compensation?},
            	year={2016},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={10153},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/publications/dp10153},
	abstract={Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based compensation to avoid management's excessive risk taking and short-run oriented decisions. We compile unique panel data on executive compensation over the periods 2006 to 2011 for 405 listed companies and use a Hausman-Taylor approach to estimate the effect of codetermination on the compensation design. Finally, codetermination has a significantly positive effect on performance-based components of compensation, which supports our hypothesis.},
	keywords={corporate finance;principal-agent theory;board representation;executive compensation;Hausman-Taylor},
            }