@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp9367,
            	author={Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos and Kaas, Leo},
            	title={Worker Mobility in a Search Model with Adverse Selection},
            	year={2015},
	month={Sep},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={9367},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp9367},
	abstract={We analyze the effects of adverse selection on worker turnover and wage dynamics in a frictional labor market. We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer promotion wage contracts to workers of different abilities, which is unknown to firms at the hiring stage. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and hire all types of workers in equilibrium, whereas high-wage firms offer pooling contracts, promoting high-ability workers only. Low-ability workers have higher turnover rates and are more often employed in low-wage firms. The model replicates the negative relationship between job-to-job transitions and wages observed in the U.S. labor market.},
	keywords={worker mobility;on-the-job search;adverse selection;wage dynamics},
            }