TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Brügemann, Björn
AU  - Gautier, Pieter A.
AU  - Menzio, Guido
        TI  - Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values
        PY  - 2015/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 9293
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp9293
        AB  - The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game.
        KW  - intra firm bargaining
KW  - Shapley value
        ER  -