@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp9293,
            	author={Brügemann, Björn and Gautier, Pieter A. and Menzio, Guido},
            	title={Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values},
            	year={2015},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={9293},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp9293},
	abstract={The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper. We propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex Game, that follows a simple and realistic protocol and that, under some mild restrictions, admits a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium generating a profile of wages and profits that are equal to the Shapley values. The vast applied literature that refers to the Stole and Zwiebel game to give a game-theoretic foundation to the use of the Shapley values as the outcome of the bargain between a firm and multiple workers should instead refer to the Rolodex game.},
	keywords={intra firm bargaining;Shapley value},
            }