%0 Report %A Bjedov, TjaĊĦa %A Madies, Thierry %A Villeval, Marie Claire %T Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game %D 2015 %8 2015 Mar %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) %C Bonn %7 IZA Discussion Paper %N 8953 %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp8953 %X We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate. %K conflict %K turn taking %K communication %K coordination %K experiment