@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp887,
            	author={Irlenbusch, Bernd and Sliwka, Dirk},
            	title={Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior},
            	year={2003},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={887},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp887},
	abstract={The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple
repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by
choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals’ payoffs are determined by a
random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more
transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no
significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger
diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very
large effort levels increases.},
	keywords={inequity aversion;gift exchange;reputation;reciprocity;transparency},
            }