TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Nyborg, Karine
        TI  - Reciprocal Climate Negotiators
        PY  - 2015/Feb/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 8866
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp8866
        AB  - International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail that once enough countries moved forward, others would follow suit. If the abatement game faced by climate negotiators is a Prisoners' Dilemma, and countries are narrowly self-interested, such a hope seems unfounded. However, if countries display reciprocity – a preference to repay meanness by meanness and kindness by kindness – their willingness to abate will be conditional on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.
        KW  - international environmental agreements
KW  - reciprocity
KW  - coalitions
        ER  -