@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp8866,
            	author={Nyborg, Karine},
            	title={Reciprocal Climate Negotiators},
            	year={2015},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={8866},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp8866},
	abstract={International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail that once enough countries moved forward, others would follow suit. If the abatement game faced by climate negotiators is a Prisoners' Dilemma, and countries are narrowly self-interested, such a hope seems unfounded. However, if countries display reciprocity – a preference to repay meanness by meanness and kindness by kindness – their willingness to abate will be conditional on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.},
	keywords={international environmental agreements;reciprocity;coalitions},
            }