%0 Report
        %A Cuñat, Vicente
%A Giné, Mireia
%A Guadalupe, Maria
        %T Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance
        %D 2014
        %8 2014 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 8538
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp8538
        %X This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, which leads to higher efficiency and market value.
        %K executive compensation
%K corporate governance
%K say-on-pay