@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp8538,
            	author={Cuñat, Vicente and Giné, Mireia and Guadalupe, Maria},
            	title={Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance},
            	year={2014},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={8538},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp8538},
	abstract={This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases in market value (4%) and to improvements in long-term performance: profitability and labor productivity increase, while overheads and investment fall. In contrast, we find limited effects on pay levels and structure. This suggests that SoP serves as a regular vote of confidence on the CEO, which leads to higher efficiency and market value.},
	keywords={executive compensation;corporate governance;say-on-pay},
            }