TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Lacomba, Juan A.
AU  - Lagos, Francisco Miguel
AU  - Reuben, Ernesto
AU  - Winden, Frans van
        TI  - On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict
        PY  - 2013/Jul/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 7492
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp7492
        AB  - We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents.
        KW  - contests
KW  - appropriation
KW  - conflict
KW  - tournaments
KW  - rent-seeking
KW  - peace
KW  - escalation
        ER  -